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In the past decade the African continent has been riven
by armed conflict. The record is familiar and will be
reviewed only briefly here: liberation wars have been
fought and concluded in Mozambique, Guinea-
Bissau, Angola, and Zimbabwe. Similar wars are in
progress in the Western Sahara, Namibia, and Azania
(South Africa). Civil wars are currently under way in
Ethiopia and Chad, in both cases of long duration,
and with no immediate end in sight, in spite of
substantial foreign involvement. 'National' wars were
fought in 1977 and 1978 between Ethiopia and
Somalia on one hand and Uganda and Tanzania on
the other, in the one case over disputed border
territory and in the other to unseat a regime. Both
again involved foreign intervention, but in different
forms and to greatly varying degrees.
Foreign intervention of various kinds has become a
more and more general feature of these wars, in some
cases involving actual combat by foreign troops, and
in a number of instances repeated interventions by the
same powers. France has a particularly long record of
such interventions - in Chad (several times), Shaba
(twice), and the Central African Republic, also
previously in the Cameroon, Senegal, and Gabon. The
Soviet Union and Cuba have also intervened in
Angola and Ethiopia. The United States has
intervened more covertly in Angola, Chad, Sudan,
Morocco and Egypt. If forcible intrusion by external
powers has been common, so has intervention by
regional 'powers' (South Africa in Angola since 1975,
with repeated incursions into other 'frontline' states;
Morocco and Senegal in Shaba; Libya in Chad since
1973 and more overtly since 1980; 'OAU forces' in
Chad in 1981; and Senegal in the Gambia in 1981,
etc.). Foreign troops are garrisoned on African soil in
several countries (the French in Senegal, the Ivory
Coast, Central African Republic and Djibouti,
Cubans in Angola and Ethiopia) and over the period
under review several African states offered bases on
their soil for the use of foreign military forces. Both
foreign and regional African powers have established
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or contemplated unilateral or mutual intervention
forces of which the French Forces d'Action Rapide
and the US Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) now
renamed Central Command (US CENTCOM) are th
best known.
Finally there is the deepening tendency toward coup
d'états and militarisation of the state apparatus in
Africa. At the end of 1984 no less than half of the 50
states in Africa were under military rule. The
distinction between military and civil government had
in any case become academic. Most of the civilian
governments left in power rule on the basis of their
security forces and are in practice no less repressive.
Not surprisingly these developments have been
accompanied by rapid growth in military budgets and
in the scale and sophistication of arms transfers) This
is particularly true of the North African countries
(Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia), the oil
exporters (especially Libya, Algeria, and Nigeria), and
South Africa, although there were significant
increases in individual sub-Saharan African countries
as well. The bulk of the heavy armaments transferred
to Africa also went to North Africa, South Africa, and
Ethiopia.
Given this background Africa could well be
considered the most war-torn continent of the last
decade. This is particularly true of the period 1975 to
1980. What do these developments portend, and how
might they be explained? What are the prospects for
continental disarmament and arms control? Is
militarisation the main problem? How does the
process of militarisation articulate, for instance, with
the serious economic crisis in which Africa finds itself'?
A number of preliminary considerations may help to
clarify the issues. The first is that the process of
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militarisation (viewed in terms of increased military
spending and arms acquisition) has proceeded far
from evenly over the continent as a whole. The
strongest tendencies toward military build-up have
occurred among oil-producing countries, and among
the countries of North Africa, the Horn and Southern
Africa, particularly South Africa. These are either
countries located close to a zone of endemic war (the
Middle East) or actually involved in war (South
Africa, the Horn, Morocco in the Sahara), or
commanding the surpluses to finance large-scale arms
purchases (the oil producers), or both (the North
African oil-exporters). On the other hand the military
build-up has been much less pronounced among the
remaining African states, who constitute the majority.
In a number of cases in this last group the level of
military expenditure (expressed in constant dollars)
has actually declined, largely in response to the current
recession. The oil-exporting countries (including
Libya, Algeria, Nigeria, Gabon, Congo and Cameroon
but excluding Angola) accounted for almost 50 per cent
and 20 per cent respectively of the total arms bill of the
oil exporters. Among the oil importing North African
countries Egypt is the largest single purchaser,
accounting for between 50 and 58 per cent of total
African arms supplies from the l960s until 1974, when
her purchases were outstripped by those of Libya and
Algeria. However, in 1982 and 1983 Egypt, Morocco,
and Tunisia again accounted for no less than 58 per cent
of all major African arms imports. This situation has
evolved as a result of the new strategic relationship
recently constructed between the United States, Egypt
and Morocco.
These regional variations mean it is difficult to make
valid generalisations for Africa as a whole. Currently
the continent is divided into a small group of relatively
well-armed countries (South Africa, Egypt, Libya,
Algeria, Morocco, Ethiopia, and Nigeria) and a much
larger group of countries whose military forces and
armaments levels are no more than adequate for
purposes of legitimate territorial defence (in many
cases less than adequate). Of the countries in the first
group only Ethiopia and Nigeria are located in black
Africa, while with the exception of South Africa all
others are in North Africa. A second consideration is
that the accelerated acquisition of armaments over the
period in question was largely the result of a specific
but probably temporary conjuncture - in particular
the uncompleted agenda of national liberation and
windfall oil surpluses - which provided both the
necessity and the opportunity to acquire arms on an
unusually large scale. With changes in this conjuncture
(drastic falls in oil revenue, scaling down of some wars,
etc.) there has been a sharp decline in overall arms
transfers, particularly to oil-producers and Black
Africa.
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In any case the absolute limits to this process of
militarisation should be stressed. In terms of certain
indices (such as volume of military spending and
number of soldiers in relation to population) Africa
remains one of the less militarised continents. In 1978,
at the peak of the military build-up, Africa accounted
for 25 per cent of total Third World arms imports, but
only 6.5 per cent of all Third World military
expenditures, and 1.5 per cent of total world military
expenditures. It could be argued plausibly that, on the
contrary, it is precisely the low military means of
African states that is the cause of certain types of
military hostilities, such as foreign and South African
armed interventions. Thus defining 'armamentism' as
the core problem merely leads to endless confusion
about cause and effect. What is impressive and worth
analysing is the fact that at the same time as Africa as a
whole ranks low in the volume and technical
sophistication of armaments, the continent ranks high
in the frequency of war, coups and foreign incursions,
as well as in the level of domestic repression, abuse of
human rights, and displaced populations (refugees)
- conditions synonymous with rampant militarism.
A low capacity for acquiring and absorbing
armaments has not prevented these tendencies from
developing; in most of these respects there is little
difference between the least and the most heavily
armed countries in Africa. This suggests the need to
shift the focus of analysis from arms as such to some
understanding of the social and material conditions
underlying this generalisation of violence and
repression.
Another justification for this shift in focus is that the
regional variations in militarisation noted above in
fact obscure certain obvious similarities in the
structures and historical experiences of African
societies. Indeed these apparent variations represent
more than different facets (unevenly developed as
between countries and regions) of the common
structures and experiences of these countries. lt can be
argued that the rampant militarisation of life and
society in Africa expresses in many ways the typical
trajectory of development of the peripheral social
formations at the present stage of imperialism. This
stage is characterised by (a) the internationalisation of
capital in its monopoly form, as productive capital (the
so-called knew international division of labour');
(b) profound shifts in the balance of power and of
class forces on the world scene, between on the one
hand imperialism and national liberation, and on the
other between capitalism and socialism; (c) the
multilateralisation of imperialism, and finally (d) a
generalised crisis in world capitalism. What we are
seeing in Africa, to a large extent, are the effects of
certain fundamental political and economic changes
underlying this conjuncture which have had far-
reaching implications for the strategic balance in
Africa and for the stability of its social formations.
In the first instance, these formations are all defined by
their colonial origin. Colonialism left them with
particularly complex contradictions, reflected in their
fragmentation on racial, class, communal and
cultural/religious lines, and in their inability to
constitute coherent social relations. These contra-
dictions arose principally from the essentially racist
culture and primitive capitalism of colonial society.
The penetration of capitalism simultaneously dissolved
previous modes of production and abolished the
traditional self-sufficiency of the lineage economy;
and on the other hand implanted a new social division
of labour based on the commoditisation of labour and
the privatisation of the social means of production.
The creation of entirely arbitrary frontiers corres-
ponding to the economic and strategic interests of
foreign powers permanently divided many nationalities
and placed them under different colonial admini-
strations, at the same time abolishing their previous
autonomy and subjecting them forcibly to a
centralised state authority. These transformations in
the body of African society were responsible not only
for new forms of racial and class struggles but also for
the conflicts between nationalities and cultures. The
'tribalism' and 'nationalities question' so central to
African politics often constituted in reality either
forms of resistance to this reconstitution of the
previous conditions of communal life, or covert
vehicles of class struggle.
The nature of the colonial experience accounts for the
two most common forms of war in Africa. First, wars
of liberation, which became from the early 1970s on
the typical mode of decolonisation, as opposed to the
consensual decolonisations of the 1950s and 1960s.
The victory of the liberation wars created (especially in
Southern Africa) far-reaching changes in the regional,
and potentially global, balance of power and exerted
considerable strategic influence on the Indian Ocean
and Middle East. In a number of cases (Angola,
Zimbabwe, possibly Namibia) these wars were
overlaid by ideological and ethnic divisions among the
liberation forces themselves. Second, wars of
seccession or civil wars (Ethiopia, Chad, Sudan,
previously Nigeria and Zaire, and lesser examples),
and 'border' wars (Somalia vs. Ethiopia). Although
these originate typically as internal wars, various
factors (ideological issues, the strategic location of the
battleground, etc.) invite foreign involvement. Foreign
participation is almost invariably a feature of both
types of war, and may prove decisive in determining
their outcome, or, at the very least, increase their
duration and intensity. Foreign participation is
stimulated by the coincidence of the objectives of one
or other of the regional combatants with the strategic
objectives of an external power. In most instances
involving the NATO powers, it is stimulated by the
desire to protect client regimes. This latter type of
intervention is associated with the erosion of the
NATO hegemony in Africa by liberation wars and the
growing fragility of client regimes in political and
economic difficulties. This is particularly true of
recent US and French interventions. Given the
dependent character of African societies, and the high
level of influence retained in them by the foreign
bourgeoisies, such participation (which differs only in
form and degree from other means by which these
bourgeoisies make their influence felt) cannot
properly be considered as 'external'. On the contrary,
such interventions constitute a 'normal' aspect of their
politics.
A second result of the colonial experience consists in
the fact that these countries attained independence
with a certain pathology entrenched in their economic
structures. But this alone provides little understanding
of what has subsequently happened in these countries.
African countries, with few exceptions, have been
characterised since independence by a particular
ideology and broad strategy of development. This
ideology conceptualised 'development' in terms of
capitalist industrialisation, emphasised the primacy of
foreign capital as the 'engine' of a process of growth
oriented toward the world market. This developmental
ideology did not arise uniquely from the African
economies but was partly the product of fundamental
changes in world capitalism associated with the post-
war imperialist conjuncture mentioned above, and
which already involved substantial modification of the
international division of labour. This modification
entailed a measure of industrial relocation and the
initiation of semi-manufacturing activities in peripheral
countries under the financial and technological
control of multinational companies (MNCs), accom-
panied simultaneously by the fragmentation of the
labour process on a global scale. It also involved a new
role for banks and international financial agencies in
the financing of Third World 'development'. The
financial activities of the banks reached particularly
high levels with the emergence of OPEC oil surpluses
and the Eurocurrency market. Peripheral industriali-
sation was in the interest of the foreign monopolies,
given not only the high volume of business created for
the banks and credit agencies, but also the
monopolistic privileges, tariff protection, tax and
investment concessions, and repressive labour regimes
available to the industrial corporations in a period
when high wages, falling profit margins, and sharp
international competition was the rule. The MNCs, by
fragmenting previously integrated production pro-
cesses across widely separated geographical regions
and reintegrating them exclusively within their world-
wide organisational structures, were able to effect
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maximal export of 'profits' and to minimise national
control. The problem was not exclusively at the micro
level: the emphasis on foreign capital as the primary
condition for the technological advancement of
productive forces in the peripheral countries required
that the labour process in these countries be
subordinated to the self-valorisation of foreign
capital, and that their economic expansion be
conditional on the expanded reproduction of the
metropolitan economies.
Two observations are relevant here about this form of
development. The first regards the greatly enhanced
role of the state and of the political domain in this
process. The process of capitalist transformation
(under whatever name it is disguised) requires as a
precondition a revolution in social and economic
relations and attitudes. This entails the uprooting of
archaic forms, the smashing or reconstitution of social
relations and practices that constitute barriers to the
penetration and valorisation of capital, and so on. In
this process the state, in addition to its direct
intervention in production, plays an unusually
prominent role. This same process necessarily involves
various degrees of social dislocation and conflict and
provokes resistance, often clothed in the inchoate
language of traditionalism, communal 'rights' or
religious fundamentalism. As in the colonial period
these transformations, associated with the 'march of
progress', are directly or indirectly responsible for the
prevalence of the communal, regional, and religious
antagonisms that underlie African militarisation (the
more so as the post-colonial state itself, in addition to
its class character, is often perceived to have a
'partisan' ethnic, regional, or religious identity). This
situation is also responsible for the tendency of
African states to define their role primarily in terms of
the establishment of a new social and structural
equilibrium and the arbitration of contending social
interests ('national integration').
Secondly, this form of development, in combination
with certain internal factors, has left Africa
particularly vulnerable to the global capitalist crisis.
This developmental strategy, oriented toward the
world market, has been characterised by the export of
multiplier effects (profits,jobs, R & D, etc.) and by the
fact that the bulk of value is retained either within the
networks of the MNCs or recycled in the servicing of
external loans and credits. For this reason little
'development' has taken place on African soil. Given
their particular location in the 'new' international
division of labour, and their role in keeping up the
general rate of profit for international capital, the
African countries (like other underdeveloped
economies) tend to reproduce in an exaggerated way
the periodic crises of the world market. This has been
apparent in Africa since the mid-l960s. In the last
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decade however, this crisis has become particularly
acute, and manifests itself in debt-peonage, industrial
and agricultural collapse, and the threat of mass
starvation. Much of the responsibility for this crisis
must be located within the continent itself, in adverse
natural and ecological conditions, and perhaps even
more in colossal waste and mismanagement by
African leaders. Nevertheless it is equally clear that
this crisis is part of the generalised crisis of capitalism.
In the advanced capitalist countries this crisis, and the
reorganisation of the social conditions of production
necessary to mediate it, entail increasingly anarchic
and crisis-ridden conditions, with the worst recession
in a half-century, the failure of traditional (Keynesian)
anti-recessionary policies, and the emergence of
conservative monetarist governments in the key
capitalist countries. Militarism is a prominent aspect
of the international posture of such regimes, a fact
already apparent in their African policies.
In Africa the appearance (or reflection) of this crisis
coincided with the emergence, first in individual
countries in the l960s, and then increasingly on a
continental scale, of repressive and authoritarian
regimes of 'austerity'. Economic retrogression,
approaching the dimensions of disaster in many
countries, has been worsened by war in some
situations and in turn stimulates war. Although
accurate statistics are lacking, it can be assumed that
for every person displaced by war, several more are
displaced by drought and economic decline.
However, the authoritarian military and civil regimes
which have now become the standard political form in
Africa do not emerge simply to hold together these
fragmented and crisis-ridden formations. On the
contrary they constitute - and this has become
particularly clear since 1980 - the necessary
condition for the particular mode of 'crisis manage-
ment' which is taking place on the continent under the
superintendence of the international financial agencies
(the IMF and the World Bank). This process is
informed less by concern for the material well-being of
the African masses than by the interests of the
corporate and banking monopolies and the strategic
objectives of the NATO powers. Its instruments are a
set of brutal 'austerity' measures (large-scale retrench-
ment of workers, severe cutbacks in educational,
health and social welfare spending, etc.) which fall
predominantly on the shoulders of the poor, and
which in many ways exacerbate the crisis. Consequently
these 'adjustment programs' require as their vehicle
regimes with considerable actual or potential
repressive capability (this is already quite obvious in
Latin America, but the recent coups in the Sudan,
Ghana and Nigeria point in similar directions). The
irony is that many of the funds 'saved' on welfare and
other forms of spending on the poor are eventually
diverted into arms, which become necessary to repress
the resulting social contradictions. Between 1978 and
1982 at least 26 African countries entered into some
form of 'understanding' with the IMF, on terms which
were, according to the 1MF itself, more onerous than
any previously imposed. Thus at the precise moment
of their increasing militarisation and repressiveness,
African states retain less 'sovereignty' than at any time
since independence.
It is clear that for most of Africa - the apparent
proliferation of arms conflicts notwithstanding - the
real 'wars' are their struggles against their repressive
conditions of existence. It is at this level that the 'peace
question' should first be posed. The fundamental
problem is the quality of material life and of social
relations, and the availability of means for advancing
this quality (or at least preventing its retrogression !)
and resolving conflicts peacefully. The militarist
option dominant in Africa indicates both the
acuteness of the contradictions and the limited means
for their mediation; it is not a product simply of the
availability of arms per se.
From this point of view there is a good deal wrong
with the conventional way of posing the 'peace' and
'disarmament' question. First of all there is exclusive
stress - consistent with the interests of the world
powers on nuclearisation, and very little (except in a
manipulative sense) on exploitation, repression and
abuse of real human rights, as the threat to 'peace'.
This 'concern' (like the concern over apartheid) is
easily appropriated by even the most repressive and
militarist regimes in Africa, and everybody is able to
take a 'progressive' position on this question.
Secondly, the 'nuclearisation' versus 'peace' formula
robs the concept of peace of any immediate, social
content. In Africa the immediate threat to peace lies in
those conditions which are bringing the continent to
the verge of barbarism. Fear of nuclear war runs a
poor second to more immediate, mundane fears about
job security, the threat of starvation, disease, anxiety
over the most basic necessities of life - fears more
debilitating than any provoked by nuclear weaponry.
There was an incident recently that is worth quoting in
this context. On May Day in Lagos this year Nigerian
workers grumbled and booed when the Secretary-
General of the Nigerian Labour Congress commenced
his traditional May Day address with a condemnation
of the nuclear 'arms race'. Commenting on the
incident, a leading national daily observed that the
Secretary-General had demonstrated the 'wrong order
of priorities' in talking about issues that Nigerian
workers (faced with mass retrenchment) did not at
that moment 'care to think about' (National Concord,
Lagos, May 3).
Nor were the Nigerian workers necessarily acting
irresponsibly. The nuclear monopoly consigns the
future of disarmament and the negotiating process to a
small coterie of world powers and leaders, marginalis-
ing the voices of the vast majority of humanity, even
within the nuclearised countries. Even more important,
the focus on nuclearisation has a clear ideological
function, and that is precisely to push the argument for
qualitative transformation from the agenda. The
fright generated by repeated warnings of the
probability of nuclear war and even the possibility or
imminence of 'limited nuclear war' predisposes people
to accept 'peace' at any price. The question of
transformation of the existing framework of social
and global relations is relegated to the background.
This motive is not absent from the thinking of
successive American administrations, the present one
in particular. Conversely, every revolutionary struggle
for justice and change is branded as a threat to 'peace'.
Naturally this conception of 'peace' and what
constitutes 'threats' to it has served to discredit
thoroughly the idea of peace itself.
Finally there is a real possibility that disarmament
negotiations may be used to forestall changes in the
global and regional balance of power through the
strategy of 'linkage', which ties progress on
disarmament to progress on regional questions in
Africa and elsewhere. This is a position advanced by
the Americans, and was a major factor in the non-
ratification of SALT II. In this case progress in
disarmament can only take place at the expense of
national liberation. Similarly with the doctrine of
'equal security' enshrined as a basis for these
negotiations: although a plausible principle on which
to base mutual negotiations, its political implications
are quite profound. For America and the NATO
powers 'security' has to include as a condition the
maintenance of the present international division of
labour and continued access to the resources and
markets of other countries, i.e. the preservation of free
trade regimes and resistance to local sovereignty over
resources - precisely the structures which many
Third World countries wish to change. And indeed
questions of 'economic security' have received
increasing emphasis in the NATO definition of 'equal
security', largely as a result of regional developments
in Africa and the Middle East. This conception of
'security', once adopted, leads logically not only to
'linkage' but also to RDF/ USCENTCOM-style
interventionalism.
It is not clear that 'disarmament' is rendered any more
meaningful by shifting it from the focus on
nuclearisation and tying it to the problematic of
development. Here arms spending is seen as standing
in opposition to 'productive' socioeconomic invest-
ment. The assumption is that reduced arms spending
by the major powers as well as the underdeveloped
countries can be expected to release more funds for
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development expenditure. Naturally the vast (and
growing) gap between arms spending and development
aid transfers must offend any sense of decency. There
is something positively obscene about cutting the
income of aged pensioners, or eliminating lunches for
low-income schoolchildren, in order to finance the
acquisition of even better weapons of destruction, as is
currently happening in the leading capitalist countries.
Nevertheless there are a number of problems with the
'arms versus development' formula. The first is
empirical: there is no evidence that resources released
from cutbacks in arms spending would necessarily go
into development spending, rather than, say, other
forms of 'waste' or unproductive spending.
At the same time the argument either ignores the
presumed growth effects of arms spending in the large
arms-producing countries, or rejects arms spending as
being less 'growth generating' than alternative
investment in other, directly productive areas. Under
capitalism however the question is not gro wih but the
kind of growth that results in the maximisation of the
rate of profit. This objective may be better achieved by
'wasteful' investments in armaments than in satisfying
basic human needs. These considerations are already
shaping the reception in the NATO countries of
President Reagan's 'Strategic Defence Initiative'
('Star Wars'). In spite of the official 'hedging' of
governments, Western corporations are already
queueing up for contracts from the $26 bn budget, and
there are fears that the spin-offs from this research
funding may increase the technological gap between
Europe and America unless there is European
participation. The concern for profit and market
competitiveness, rather than pious condemnation of
the militarisation of space, ultimately will decide the
European reaction.
Admittedly the same considerations do not appear to
apply in those underdeveloped countries where arms
procurement does not generate similar multiplier
effects. However even in such cases arms procurement
may not always entail proportionate economic costs,
since it may be financed largely by outright or partial
grants and soft credits and reflect the strategic
interests of one or other superpower. This allows
countries like Egypt, Morocco or Ethiopia to maintain
what appear to be disproportionately large military
establishments.
The second, more fundamental problem with the
'disarmament vs. development' formula is ideological.
This consists in its idealism and lack of understanding
of the social utility of force, that is of the existence of
material contradictions that condition armament, and
hence of the fact that the latter may be necessary for
the reproduction of certain structures and relation-
ships at either the domestic or global level, or both.
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This is the case with the imperialist hegemony, which
can only be maintained, at this juncture, by global (or
globalised) systems of violence. It could be argued that
contemporary peripheral conditions of accumulation,
and the crises associated with them, necessitate
precisely such outlays on force, and that whether or
not the outlays are 'excessive' is a secondary matter.
This outlay could also be argued to be a condition for
military social dominance, which, far from being a
form of political deviance, appears on the contrary, to
be a necessary aspect of the morphology of
contemporary underdevelopment. Thus instead of
counterposing (in a utopian manner) 'arms' and
'development', we need rather to investigate the
objective relation between certain forms of develop-
ment and arms - or, more properly stated, between
development and repressive and militaristic policies.
The relationship between development and armament
may then be reformulated, analytically, in terms of the
struggle to establish or sustain the political pre-
conditions for a particular form of 'development'. The
process of 'development' is not politically neutral. It
always involves a struggle between socialism and
capitalism, the form of development in a particular
country is the product of a definite correlation, not
only of domestic, but also of international class forces.
In this sense both the high level of domestic political
violence and the active participation of external forces
are fundamental to the process of development in the
Third World countries, rather than extraneous or in
opposition to it.
Postscript: the Possibility of an African
'Nuclear Free Zone'
In spite of the foregoing, a good case can be made for
declaring and enforcing a 'nuclear free zone' (NFZ) in
Africa. Such proposals have been made several times
by African leaders since the 1960s. There have been
similar proposals for NFZs in the Middle East, the
Mediterranean, Latin America, and Northern Europe.
But the African case appears particularly strong,
partly because of the relatively low level of military
sophistication on the continent, the absence of vital
strategic targets, and the fact that until 1979, few if any
African countries appeared capable of the technology
required for the production of nuclear weaponry. In
spite of this it is far from clear that a NFZ in Africa is
feasible or relevant. In the first place 'Star Wars'
proposals, if allowed to proceed (as seems certain),
will render the concept of a NFZ largely useless.
Secondly, NFZ schemes, although excellent in theory,
have a poor record of actual implementation. Before
the recent unilateral declaration of a NFZ by Iceland,
the only example of a NFZ was the Tlatelolco
agreement of 1967 between Latin American countries
which banned the presence of nuclear weapons on the
territory of the participating states (although it did not
prohibit transhipment or include all the countries on
the continent). Thirdly, in the case of Africa, the
nuclearisation of the neighbouring Indian Ocean is
already a distinct possibility. In recent years there has
been a substantial naval build-up in the Indian Ocean
by the United States and the Soviet Union, with
surface and submarine vessels permanently stationed
in the region. Although neither power discloses which
of its vessels carry nuclear weaponry, it is only realistic
to expect the presence of some form of nuclear
weaponry on board vessels belonging to both sides.
On the Indian subcontinent a nuclear arms race
between India and Pakistan also appears inevitable.
Even on the African continent itself the possibility of a
NFZ may already have been foreclosed by the almost
certain development of a nuclear capability by South
Africa. This has led in turn to demands that Nigeria,
for instance, should 'go nuclear' to counter the South
African threat, although it is not certain how seriously
such demands should be taken.
In any case any NFZ can be established only with the
agreement and collaboration of the superpowers and
enforced by those powers. The policy of restraint that
this requires cannot be discerned in the present
international atmosphere. African countries them-
selves have no effective means of enforcing a NFZ. On
the contrary the economic and military weakness of
African countries may render them particularly
vulnerable to various forms of nuclear blackmail (such
as secret stationing or transhipment of nuclear
weapons in violation of NFZ provisions), in principle
no different from the external manipulations that have
characterised the proposals for 'mutual security'
arrangements, etc. There have been persistent and
disturbing rumours of African governments con-
templating secret agreements that would permit the
dumping of nuclear wastes off their continental shelf
in return for large payments, and in one case an
African government (Zaire) actually allowed the
testing on its soil of rocketry with potential nuclear
application.
Conclusion
The case for disarmament has not been established in
Africa. This is due to the emphasis on arms control
rather than on solutions to the systemic contradictions
which produce violence. It is assumed that once a
correct-negotiating formula has been found and
agreement reached on limitation of arms, wars will be
minimised or eradicated. The situation in Africa
shows that there is in fact no inconsistency between a
relatively low level of armaments and a high level of
war and political violence. On the other hand it is
surprising how infrequently official 'disarmament'
and 'arms control' advocates address the underlying
problems - of class oppression, injustice and
deprivation - responsible for violence in Africa. A
second misconception is in the tendency to oppose
'militarism' (and in particular military spending) and
'development', without attempting to analyse their
social relation. These conventional positions have
rendered largely irrelevant (if not entirely discredited)
disarmament and the 'peace' campaign as far as Africa
is concerned. Before one can address successfully the
problem of war and arms in Africa (and elsewhere),
one must first address the problem of justice.
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